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Introduction
During the period 1933-1939, many German Jews sought to escape Nazi
anti-Semitism and persecution by immigrating to the United States as well as to
other countries. 1 In the United States, the four government officials who controlled American immigration policy with respect to Germany were themselves
anti-Semitic. These officials, primarily senior management within the State
Department and Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), manipulated the criteria
governing the issuance of visas to restrict the entry of German Jewish refugees
under the authority of restrictive immigration legislation that had existed for
years. 2 State Department officials used a variety of techniques to restrict German
Jewish immigration to the United States. All of them were related to the requirement that a visa applicant must establish that he was not likely to become a public

1

For the purpose of this thesis, “Germany” refers to all territory it acquired as of
September 1, 1939: Austria (March 12, 1938), the Sudetenland (September 29, 1938),
the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (March 15, 1939) and Memel in Lithuania
(March 22, 1939).
2
Although the estimated number of German Jewish refugees who immigrated to
the United States between 1933 and 1939 ranges from 60,000 to 95,000, the actual number is a matter of historical dispute. The estimate is a result of variations in the way in
which the total is calculated. The lower figure only includes those refugees who came
directly to the United States from Germany and Austria (whose annual quota was 1,413).
The higher figure incorporates those who emigrated from Germany and those who went
to other countries after leaving Germany and re-immigrated to the United States. See
Herbert A. Strauss, "Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses (II)," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 26, no. 1 (January 1,1981): 362, n.25;
Herbert A. Strauss, ed., Jewish Immigrants of the Nazi Period in the USA, Vol. II, Annotated Bibliography (New York, NY; Detroit, MI: K.G. Saur; Distributed by Gale
Research Co., 1981), xx.

charge (LPC), i.e., those who could not demonstrate that they could financially
support themselves pursuant to American immigration law.
During the 1930s, Wilbur J. Carr (Head of Consular Services, 1901-1924,
Assistant Secretary of State, 1924-1937), William Phillips (Under Secretary of
State, 1922-1924, 1933-1936), George S. Messersmith (FSO in Berlin, 19301932; Ambassador to Austria, 1934-1937; Assistant Secretary of State, 19371940), and Raymond H. Geist (FSO in Berlin, 1929-1939) were the principal officials who controlled the decisions with respect to the issuance of visas to German
Jewish refugees. There is direct evidence that Carr and Phillips were anti-Semitic
and that their antipathy to Jews had a long history. There is strong circumstantial
evidence suggesting that Messersmith and Smith held similar anti-Jewish beliefs.
Their anti-Semitism is critical in explaining the decisions to restrict the immigration of German Jews.
With the explicit encouragement of Carr and Phillips, Messersmith and
Geist and the other FSOs in Berlin issued approximately 75,000 visas out of
approximately 300,000 German Jewish applicants. In other words, hundreds of
thousands of visa applications were arbitrarily rejected and only 25% of German
Jewish applicants received visas. The arguments they advanced in support of the
restrictive application of the LPC provision lacked merit. These arguments were
pretexts to conceal their own anti-Semitism, which was the primary factor
influencing their denial of visas to German Jews between 1933 and 1939.
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The most common arguments advanced by these officials as justification
for rejecting the vast majority of visa applications from German Jews closely
paralleled those expressed by many Americans. These claims were: (1) a “huge”
influx of German Jewish immigrants would exacerbate the severe unemployment
conditions that existed in the United States during the Great Depression; (2) many
of the refugees were allegedly political radicals, i.e., “Bolsheviks,” and therefore
posed a potential threat to American national security; and (3) the refugee issue
was “a Jewish problem,” which the United States had no obligation or responsibility to resolve. 3 These assertions are false. In fact, such claims are pretexts for
anti-Semitic decisions to restrict the issuance of visas at a level substantially
below the authorized quotas.
During the period 1933 to 1939, approximately 300,000 German Jews applied for visas to immigrate to the United States. 4 Approximately 75,000 German
Jews received visas; the applications of the rest were rejected. The quota for
Germany during this seven-year period permitted the issuance of 183,112 visas.
As a result of the restrictive interpretation of American immigration law by Carr

3

Historians have frequently identified these arguments. See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen,
"The Social and Economic Consequences of Exclusionary Immigration Laws," National
Lawyers Guild Quarterly 2 (October 1939): 171-192; David Brody, "American Jewry,
Refugees and Immigration Restriction," in American Jewish History, edited by Jeffrey S.
Gurock, Vol. 7 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1997), 219-247; Aristide R. Zolberg, "The
Roots of American Refugee Policy”, Social Research 55, no. 4 (Winter 1988): 649-678.
4
According to Geist, 286,210 German Jews had applied for immigration visas
between June 30, 1933 and April 30, 1939. Otto D. Tolischus, “Troubleshooter in
Berlin,” The New York Times, July 23, 1939.
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and Phillips and the efforts of FSOs Geist and Messersmith, the German quota
remained substantially unfulfilled between 1933 and 1939. The number of visas
issued to German Jews during this period represented 40.48% of the authorized
quota. Seventy-five percent of the approximately 300,000 visa applications submitted by German Jews during this period were denied. These statistics are
beyond dispute. 5
However, there is substantial controversy among historians with respect to
the influence of anti-Semitism on the State Department’s restrictive immigration
policy. There are three principal schools of thought concerning the explanation for
the restrictive policy regarding the issuance of visas to German Jews during this
period of increasingly violent and widely publicized persecution of the Jews in
Germany. First, historians such as Professor Bat-Ami Zucker and journalists, such
as Arthur D. Morse, maintain that anti-Semitism was the primary factor in
5

Specifically, the following table is a breakdown of the percentage of German
Jewish immigrants admitted to the United States between 1933 and 1939:
Year

1933

1934

1935

1936

1937

Number Admitted

1,450

3,740 5,530

6,650

11,520 17,870 27,370

Percentage of Quota

.055

14.4

25.6

44.3

21.3

1938

65.2

1939

100.0

Because the annual German quota was 25,957 and increased to 27,370 after the
Austrian Auschluss in March 1938, the total allowable quota from 1933 to 1939 was
183,112 (25,957 x 6 = 155,742 + 27,370 = 183,112). However, FSOs issued visas to only
74,130 German Jewish immigrants. Strauss, "Jewish Emigration from Germany: Nazi
Policies and Jewish Responses (II)," 359. The low percentage is even more striking when
compared to the total number of visas issued, 74,130, to the total authorized quota for
German Jews during that period.
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explaining this restrictive American immigration policy. 6 Second, historians such
as David Wyman, Henry Feingold and Saul Friedman argue that other factors,
including, but not limited to, anti-Semitism, were responsible for this policy. 7
Finally, scholars such as Richard Breitman and Alan Kraut urge that “bureaucratic
indifference” and not anti-Semitism was the source of this policy. 8
The first inquiry into this subject began with the publication of journalist
Arthur D. Morse’s While Six Million Died, a Chronicle of American Apathy
(1968), which investigated America's inadequate response to the Nazi persecution
of European Jews and the Holocaust. Morse examined the actions of Carr and
Phillips during the 1930s and concluded that their anti-Semitism was the primary

6

Arthur D. Morse, While Six Million Died; a Chronicle of American Apathy
(New York, NY: Random House, 1968); Bat-Ami Zucker, In Search of Refuge: Jews
and US FSOs in Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (London; Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell,
2001); Bat-Ami Zucker, "American Refugee Policy in the 1930s," in Refugees from Nazi
Germany and the Liberal European States, edited by Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore
(New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010): 151-168.
7
David S. Wyman, Paper Walls; America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941
(Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968), 210-13. Subsequently, Wyman
published The Abandonment of the Jews, which focused on the cause of America’s inadequate efforts to respond to the German Jewish refugee problem during World War II. See
David Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews: America and the Holocaust, 1941-1945
(New York, NY: Pantheon Books, 1984); Wyman, Paper Walls, 213; Henry L. Feingold,
The Politics of Rescue; the Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938-1945 (New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1970); Henry L. Feingold, Bearing Witness:
How America and Its Jews Responded to the Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Saul S. Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed; United States Policy
toward Jewish Refugees,1938-1945 (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 1973).
8
Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European
Jewry, 1933-1945 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 9, 36; Richard
Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, "Anti-Semitism in the State Department, 1933-44: Four
Case Studies," in Anti-Semitism in American History, edited by David A. Gerber
(Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 181.
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factor influencing the decisions to restrict the issuance of visas to German Jews. 9
Simultaneously, Professor David Wyman published Paper Walls: America
and the Refugee Crisis, 1938-1941 (1968) where he identified three factors as the
basis for American restrictive immigration policies, i.e., nativism, xenophobia,
and anti-Semitism. Although Wyman suggested that latent anti-Semitism was
responsible for the insensitive attitude of the State Department, he refused to
characterize these officials as truly “anti-Semitic.” Wyman concluded that neither
President Roosevelt nor the State Department nor Congress was solely responsible for restrictive American immigration policy because "[v]iewed within the
context of its times, United States refugee policy from 1938 to the end of 1941
was essentially what the American people wanted.” 10
Subsequently, historians such as Henry Feingold and Bat Ami-Zucker
examined the three factors identified by Wyman and concluded Wyman’s analysis
was unsatisfactory in explaining the actions of the State Department. These scholars reviewed the role of anti-Semitism with respect to the implementation of
American immigration policy concerning the growing Jewish refugee crisis in
Europe. They examined the activities of senior officials in the Roosevelt administration and the Department of State in implementing that policy. 11 In The

9

Morse, While Six Million Died, 194-98.
Wyman, Paper Walls, 210-13.
11
See Feingold, The Politics of Rescue; Feingold, Bearing Witness; Friedman,
No Haven for the Oppressed; Zucker, In Search of Refuge; Zucker, "American Refugee
Policy in the 1930s."
10
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Politics of Rescue, Feingold argued that FSOs were essentially unsympathetic to
Jewish refugees and suggested that their conduct was somewhat related to their
personal prejudices towards Jews. However, he concluded that anti-Semitism was
not the dominant factor.
In American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945, Richard
Breitman and Alan Kraut examined the actions of Carr and Phillips. They found
that the decisions of Carr and Phillips significantly affected the number of
German Jewish refugees admitted into the United States, but concluded that their
conduct was the product of “bureaucratic indifference” rather than antiSemitism.12
In 2001, Zucker published In Search of Refuge, which focused on the role
of FSOs, especially Messersmith and Geist (whom she referred to as “frontline
soldiers” in Germany and Austria) with respect to consular visa policy between
1933 and 1939. According to Professor Zucker, a deeply entrenched antiSemitism existed in America’s Foreign Service and in American society in
general and this prejudice resulted in the passage of the 1924 Act. Zucker concluded that the FSOs, acting in this pervasive anti-Semitic atmosphere, applied a
severely restrictive immigration policy to German Jewish visa applicants. Their

12

Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European
Jewry, 1933-1945. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 9, 36; Breitman,
"Anti-Semitism in the State Department, 1933-44: Four Case Studies," 181.
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decisions reflected anti-Semitic prejudice, which senior officials of the State
Department, such as Carr and Phillips, encouraged. 13
These scholars have examined many factors that influenced American
immigration policy with respect to the entry of Jews to the United States during
this period. They include American public opinion, which overwhelmingly supported limited immigration, the grave economic situation of the 1930s and the
strong sense of isolationism among Americans that the Third Reich’s increasingly
belligerent attitude toward the international community and its treatment of
German Jews was a “European problem.” Historians have analyzed the role of
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his administration and senior officials of the
State Department with respect to the growing Jewish refugee crisis. More recently, scholars have examined the role of FSOs and their influence upon interpretation of American immigration policy.
Examination of the evidence relating to Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and
Geist establishes that their anti-Semitism was the primary influence on their decisions as government officials with respect to immigration policy concerning
German Jews between 1933 and 1939.
Wilbur J. Carr (1870-1942) grew up on a farm in Ohio and did not come
from a wealthy family or have “social connections.” He initially entered government service as a clerk in the State Department (1892), and his successful career
13

Zucker, In Search of Refuge, 28-45; 173-174, 177.
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at the State Department is a testament to his persistence and hard work. His subsequent promotions to Director of Consular Services (1909), his appointment as
Assistant Secretary of State (1924) and later as ambassador to Czechoslovakia
(1937) represent a “tribute to the merit system.” Carr was the quintessential
bureaucrat. He found consular work to be “fascinating,” occupied the same office
in the State Department for over 30 years and was “punctual, methodical, prudent,
and disciplined.” 14 During his nearly 40-year career at the State Department, Carr
introduced several new methods to streamline and to organize the myriad tasks of
the Consular Service and revised the Consular Regulations. 15 In 1920, Bainbridge
Colby (Secretary of State, 1920-21) described Carr as the “backbone” of the State
Department. 16
Unlike Carr, William Phillips (1878-1968) came from a distinguished
American family, which included the antislavery reformer Wendell Phillips and
the American jurist, John Jay. In addition to serving as the Under Secretary of
State (1922-1924, 1933-1936), Phillips held other diplomatic posts during his

14

Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," in John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner and David
Brody, eds., Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH: Ohio University Press, 1971), 133.
15
Katharine Elizabeth Crane, Mr. Carr of State; Forty-Seven Years in the
Department of State (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1960), 9.
16
Carr Diary, March 23, 1920, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.
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lengthy Foreign Service career. 17 During his tenure as Third Assistant Secretary
of State (1909, 1914-17), he met a fellow Harvard graduate, Franklin D.
Roosevelt. When Roosevelt became President, he appointed Phillips to serve as
Under Secretary of State to assist Cordell Hull, who served as Secretary of State
from 1933 to 1944. Phillips' antipathy towards German Jewish refugees reflected
his longstanding and deep-seated anti-Semitism. 18
George S. Messersmith (1883-1960) was born in Pennsylvania and began
his career as a teacher in a one-room schoolhouse in Delaware. Although he never
graduated from college, Messersmith served on the board of what became the
University of Delaware (1905) and later became Secretary of the Board of Education for Delaware (1911). Disenchanted with “ignorant and prejudiced school
boards,” Messersmith entered the Foreign Service in 1914. 19 During his long
diplomatic career, he served as, inter alia, Consul-General in Berlin (1930-1934)
and Assistant Secretary of State (1937-1941). 20 In both of these positions,

17

Phillips also served as the ambassador to Luxembourg and the Netherlands
(1920-1922), Belgium (1924-1927) and Canada (1927-1929). U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Historian. Available from
http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/phillips-william. Accessed on March
15, 2011.
18
Alan M. Kraut, Richard Breitman, and Thomas W. Imhoof, "The State Department, the Labor Department, and German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940," Journal of
American Ethnic History 3, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 8-9; Breitman, American Refugee
Policy, 36.
19
Jesse H. Stiller, George S. Messersmith: Diplomat of Democracy (Chapel Hill,
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 2-6.
20
Messersmith also served as the Minister Plenipotentiary at the Legation in
Vienna (1934-1937). U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian. Available from
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Messersmith supervised personnel and consular affairs, including the issuance of
passports and visas. After the United States combined the German and Austrian
quotas in response to the Anschluss in 1938, Messersmith professed concern about
the granting of more visas to German Jews because he claimed that the American
public and Congress would strongly oppose an influx of Jewish refugees. 21 As a
FSO in Berlin, he refused to initiate any change that would expedite the processing of visas applications to help German Jews. Rather, he implemented a stricter
interpretation of the LPC requirement than his predecessor that resulted in a near
100% rejection of all visa applications sought by German Jews. 22 Although
Messersmith professed sympathy for Jews who sought visas, his actions reveal an
implacable, iron-fisted policy of strictly enforcing every requirement governing
the issuance of visas and adherence to the LPC provision. 23

http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/messersmith-george-strausser. Accessed
on March 1, 2011.
21
Minutes of President's Advisory Committee on Political Refugees, May 16,
1938, Stephen Wise Papers, P-134, Box 65, American Jewish Historical Society (YIVO
Institute Archives).
22
Zucker, In Search of Refuge, 175. In December 1930, Messersmith proudly informed his superiors that American consulates in Germany had denied 98.78 percent of
all immigrant visa applicants. By January 1931, the figure had risen to 99.02 percent, an
achievement for which the State Department commended him. Breitman, “Anti-Semitism
in the State Department, 1933-44,” 179.
23
Melissa Jane Taylor, "’Experts in Misery’? American Consuls in Austria,
Jewish Refugees and Restrictionist Immigration Policy, 1938-1941," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation (University of South Carolina, 2006), 98, n. 41; Shlomo Shafir, "George S.
Messersmith: An Anti-Nazi Diplomat's View of the German-Jewish Crisis," Jewish
Social Studies 35, no. 1 (January, 1973): 34.
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Raymond H. Geist (1885-1947) received a Ph.D. from Harvard in 1918.
Geist was a member of the United States delegation to the Paris Peace Conference
in 1919, later served on the American Relief Committee to assist starving children
in Vienna and subsequently returned to Harvard to teach. Tired of the academic
life, he entered the Foreign Service and served as FSO in Berlin from 1929 to
1939. 24 Messersmith was Geist’s immediate superior in Berlin during 1930-1934
and they were also close personal friends. 25 As early as February 1934, Geist was
aware that there were major “difficulties” for German Jews to obtain the required
supporting visa documents. 26 Nevertheless, he cautioned his superiors about
relaxing the document requirements because he allegedly feared that to do so
would increase the risk of fraud by “undesirable persons.” 27 Although he professed more sympathy towards the plight of German Jews after Kristallnacht, he
did not change his attitude towards the issuance of visas.
Chapter I reviews the history of the LPC provision in American immigration law, including a brief summary of the relevant 1882, 1917 and 1924 immigration legislation and the State Department’s administrative interpretation of this
statutory provision. Chapter II explains the visa application process and the
difficulties that German Jewish applicants faced in satisfying the LPC provision.
24

Breitman, American Refugee Policy, 43.
Melissa Jane Taylor, "Diplomats in Turmoil: Creating a Middle Ground in
Post-Anschluss Austria," Diplomatic History 32, no. 5 (November 2008): 825, n.59, 60.
26
Zucker, In Search of Refuge, 84.
27
Christoph Strupp, "Observing a Dictatorship: American Consular Reporting
on Germany, 1933-1941," GHI Bulletin 39 (Fall 2006): 83.
25
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Chapter III presents the evidence establishing the anti-Semitism of Messrs. Carr,
Phillips, Messersmith and Geist. Chapter IV evaluates the arguments that they
offered to justify their actions and demonstrates that anti-Semitism was the primary factor influencing the implementation of American immigration policy with
respect to German Jews between 1933 and 1939.
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Chapter I
The History of the LPC Provision
During its early history, the United States maintained an “open door” policy that attracted millions of immigrants of all faiths, including Jews, who sought
a better life regardless of nationality, economic need, or religion. Between 1820
and 1880, approximately 9,189,000 immigrants came to America. 28 By the early
1880s, however, American nativists, alarmed at the influx of immigrants, clamored to exclude “foreigners” whom they viewed with deep suspicion. 29 The vast
majority of these immigrants, who came from Southern, Central and Eastern
Europe, “were considered so different in composition, religion and culture from
earlier immigrants as to trigger a xenophobic reaction that served to generate
more restrictive immigration laws.” 30
In August, 1882, Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1882, which
authorized immigration officials to deny entry to “any convict, lunatic, idiot or
28

Örn B. Bodvarsson and Hendrik Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration: Theory and Policy (Berlin Heidelberg; London, UK; New York, NY: SpringerVerlag, 2009), 350. During the 19th century, the United States made no distinction between “immigrants” and “refugees” and admitted virtually all who desired to start a new
life here. Zolberg, "The Roots of American Refugee Policy," 654.
29
Nativism may be defined as “intense opposition to an internal minority on the
ground of its foreign (i.e., ‘un-American’) connections . . . By drawing on much broader
cultural antipathies, and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into a zeal to
destroy the enemies of a distinctly American way of life.” John Higham, Strangers in the
Land: Patterns of American Nativism,1860-1925 (New York, NY: Atheneum, 1963), 4.
Moreover, “nativism was deeply rooted in the loam of American culture” where the
“white Anglo-Saxon” Protestant majority” traditionally viewed minorities such as Asians,
Jews and Roman Catholics with hostility. Breitman, American Refugee Policy, 7.
30
Zucker, "American Refugee Policy in the 1930s," 152.
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any person unable to take care of himself without becoming a public charge”
(LPC). 31 However, the LPC provision was not strictly enforced for many years
and as a result, America famously became a “melting pot” of immigrants.
Between 1881 and 1914, 21,857,694 immigrants entered the United States of
which approximately 1,500,000 were Jews. 32
Alarmed at the mass influx of foreigners, Congress enacted the “cornerstone” of America’s immigration policy, the Immigration Act of 1917, which reversed America’s traditional open-door policy and denied entry to the vast majority of prospective immigrants. The 1917 Act was more restrictive than the 1882
Act because the former increased the number of categories of aliens to whom
immigration officials could deny admission, which included those individuals
believed “likely to become a public charge.”

31

33

As a result of the 1917 Act,

Section 2, Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stats. 58, 23 Stats. 115. In 1915, the Supreme Court defined an individual who “would likely become a public charge” as
“between paupers and professional beggars, and along with idiots, persons dangerously
diseased, persons certified by the examining surgeon to have a mental or physical defect
of a nature to affect their ability to earn a living, convicted felons, prostitutes and so
forth. The persons enumerated in short are to be excluded on the ground of permanent
personal objections accompanying them irrespective of local conditions unless the one
phrase before us is directed to different considerations than any other of those with which
it is associated. Presumably it is to be read as generically similar to the others mentioned
before and after.” Gegiow v. UHL, Acting Commissioner of Immigration at the Port of
New York, 239 U.S. 3, 10, n.2 (1915).
32
American Jewish Committee, The American Jewish Year Book 5706: 1945-46
Vol. XLVII, edited by Cyrus Adler and Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish
Publication of America, 1945), 652.
33
Act of February 4, 1917, H.R. 10384; Pub. L. 301; 39 Stat. 87. Section 3 of the
1917 Act sets forth those persons who would be barred from the United States: “All
idiots, imbeciles, epileptics, alcoholics, poor, criminals, beggars, any person suffering
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immigration dramatically decreased: between 1918 and 1920, only 21,019 Jews
were admitted into the United States. 34
Americans, driven by strong isolationist and nativist sentiments, which included anti-Semitism, clamored for a permanent law to severely restrict immigration after World War I.

35

These views were reflected in Congress. 36 As a result,

Congress enacted the Immigration Act of 1924, which later became known as the
National Origins Act. 37 The 1924 Act (1) established a quota system that limited

attacks of insanity, those with tuberculosis, and those who have any form of dangerous
contagious disease, aliens who have a physical disability that will restrict them from earning a living in the United States . . . polygamists and anarchists, those who were against
the organized government or those who advocated the unlawful destruction of property
and . . . persons likely to become a public charge.” (Emphasis added) The 1917 Act also
waived a literacy requirement if the immigrant asserted that he came to America in order
to avoid religious persecution from his country of origin.
34
Eugene M. Kulischer, "Jewish Migrations Past Experiences and Post-War Prospects," in Jews and the Post-War World, edited by Abraham G. Duker, Vol. 4 (New
York, NY: The American Jewish Committee, 1943), 50.
35
Herbert A. Strauss, "The Immigration and Acculturation of the German Jew in
the United States of America," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 16, no. 1 (January 1971):
75.
36
Nativism among American legislators was pervasive in the interwar period.
For example, in early 1924, representative William N. Vaile (R., Colorado) declared to
Congress: ". . . Let me emphasize here that the restrictionists of Congress do not claim
that the ‘Nordic’ race, or even the Anglo-Saxon race, is the best race in the world. Let us
concede, in all fairness, that the Czech is a more sturdy laborer, with a very low percentage of crime and insanity, that the Jew is the best businessman in the world, . . . which
have greatly enriched the world and which have, indeed, enriched us, a spiritual exaltation and an artistic creative sense which the Nordic rarely attains. Nordics need not be
vain about their own qualifications. It well behooves them to be humble. What we do
claim is that the northern European, and particularly Anglo-Saxons made this country.
Oh, yes; the others helped. But that is the full statement of the case. They came to this
country because it was already made as an Anglo-Saxon commonwealth. They added to
it, they often enriched, but they did not make it, and they have not yet greatly changed it.”
Congressional Record, 68th Congress, 1st Session (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1924), vol. 65, Part 6, April 8, 1924, p. 5922.
37
Act of May 26, 1924, H.R. 7995; Pub. L. 68-139; 43 Stat. 153.
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the number of foreign immigrants admitted into the United States and (2) provided that each quota could not exceed more than 2% of that country’s nationalorigin group residing in the United States as of 1890. The quotas for the countries
from Central and Eastern Europe excluded the number of immigrants who had
come to the United States during the period from 1890 to 1920. Pursuant to the
1924 Act, the total annual world quota permitted 153,000 immigrants to enter the
United States. The German quota was 25,957, which included both Jews and nonJews. The passage of the 1924 Act was a victory for nativists because it reflected
America’s preference for immigrants from Northern Europe. 38 American immigration law became highly restrictive without appearing to be explicitly prejudicial. 39
Another significant change in American immigration law involved the
administrative procedure regarding admission of an immigrant. Until the 1924
Act, immigration officers at the port of entry issued the visa or denied admission.
However, the 1924 Act (1) transferred the issuance of visas to the FSO of the
particular American consulate in the country of origin and (2) authorized the State

38

U.S. Department of State, Admission of Aliens into the United States: Supplement A of the Consular Regulations, Notes to Section 361 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1935), 64. Cf. The annual quota for Great Britain and
Northern Ireland was 65,721. U.S. Department of State, “Immigration Visa Statistics,”
Bulletin, Vol. II, no. 35, Publication No. 1437 (February 24, 1940), 215. Available from
HeinOnline, http://heinonline.org.
39
Brian N. Fry, Nativism and Immigration: Regulating the American Dream
(New York, NY: LFB Scholarly Publishing LLC, 2006), 51; Higham, Strangers in the
Land, 319-24.

- 17 -

Department to develop its own administrative procedures and/or forms. 40 The
issuance of a visa depended upon the completion of a lengthy seven-page visa
application and presentation of supporting documentation.
By 1930, millions of Americans became unemployed because of the Great
Depression. These dire economic conditions produced intense pressure on the
government to further restrict immigration. As a result, President Herbert Hoover
requested the State Department to locate a provision within the immigration statutes that would enable an administrative reduction in immigration without the
need for Congressional action. 41 The State Department identified the LPC provision in the 1917 Act as the statutory authority that would permit the State Department to drastically reduce immigration. During a press conference on September
9, 1930, Hoover officially announced the strict enforcement of the LPC provision.
The State Department’s administration of this provision would thereafter presume
that, in light of the Great Depression, a prospective immigrant would be unable to
find a job in the United States:

40

See Section 3 of the 1917 Act; Section 2(a) of the 1924 Act. The 1924 Act also
ended the physical inspection of each immigrant because medical evaluations were conducted at the country of embarkation. Thus, upon arrival, the emphasis shifted from
inspection of immigrants’ bodies to the inspection of their visa application and supporting
documentation. Section 24 of the 1924 Act states: “The Commissioner General, with the
approval of the Secretary of Labor, shall prescribe rules and regulations for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act; but all such rules and regulations, in so far as they
relate to the administration of this Act by consular officers, shall be prescribed by the
Secretary of State or the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor.”
41
Kraut, "The State Department, the Labor Department, and German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940," 7.
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The consular officers of the Department have the duty of issuing
visas to intending immigrants who show themselves entitled to entry
under the laws of the United States. The only important provision of
our law as to immigration is that one requiring the exclusion of
those who are liable to become public charges. In normal times an
applicant for admission, if an able-bodied worker who means to work
and has sufficient funds to support himself until he gets to his destination, would be admitted without particular stress, but in abnormal
times like the present we are endeavoring to cut down on aliens
who may prove to become public charges. (Emphasis added) 42
The State Department subsequently reprinted the directive in its weekly
publication, Press Releases, which instructed FSOs “to pass judgment with
particular care on whether the applicant may become a public charge; and if the
applicant cannot convince the officer that it is not probable, the visa will be refused. If the consular officer believes that the applicant may probably be a public
charge at any time, even during a considerable period subsequent to his arrival, he
must refuse the visa . . . and may get his visa when employment conditions again
become normal.” 43
Hoover’s 1930 directive highlighted the popular belief that new immigrants would exacerbate the already dire economic conditions caused by the Great

42

Presidential Press Conference, September 9, 1930. University of California,
Santa Barbara, The American Presidency Project. Available from
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22344.
43
U.S. Department of State, "Immigration Unemployment and Immigration Restriction," Press Releases, Publication No. 109, Weekly Issue No. 50 (September 13,
1930): 176-177. Frequently, restrictionist opponents incorrectly referred to Hoover’s Directive as an Executive Order, which they mistakenly believed could only be modified by
a “new” Executive Order. Carr was quick to point out that “[t]here is no such Executive
Order, as alleged.” Carr, “The Problem of Aliens Seeking Relief from Persecution in
Germany," April 20, 1933, Carr Papers.

- 19 -

Depression and create increased unemployment, “cheap competition for
American workers, and a heavier drain on public relief.” American newspapers
echoed public anti-alien sentiment. For example, The New York Times editorialized: “[t]his marked reduction is due to the restrictive policy that has been
followed during the years of the depression [i.e., 1929 to date]” and that the immigration laws had successfully barred 500,000 persons from entering the United
States. The Times concluded: "Had they come, they would only have swollen the
number of unemployed. No one can question the wisdom of this policy in
general.” 44
Hoover’s directive was a critical development in the enforcement of
America’s immigration laws and is significant for three reasons. First, it resulted
in a decrease of immigration without Congressional action.

45

Under this revised

administrative interpretation of the LPC provision, unless an applicant could
demonstrate that he had a specific job waiting for him or sufficient assets to
support himself or would be supported by a sponsor, he would be denied a visa. 46
Second, FSOs interpreted Hoover’s directive as an instruction to reduce
the number of visas issued, regardless of whether an immigrant could satisfy the

44

Brody, “American Jewry, Refugees and Immigration Restriction," 220; “Immigrants,” The New York Times, December 24, 1932.
45
Kraut, "Anti-Semitism in the State Department, 1933-44,” 7.
46
Wyman, Paper Walls, 3-4.
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LPC provision or not. 47 Within the specified quota for Germany, as for other
countries, the FSOs exercised discretionary authority to decide who would be
granted or denied a visa.

48

That authority was final and unreviewable.

49

Third,

Hoover’s directive became effective prior to the assumption of power by Hitler
and the Nazis on January 30, 1933 and therefore did not specifically target
German Jews. It thus provided administrative justification for decisions denying
visa applications that, in fact, were the result of anti-Semitism.
Drawing upon the statutory authority of the 1882, 1917 and 1924 Acts, the
State Department’s implementation of Hoover’s 1930 directive with its presumption of unemployment represented the final legal justification to deny admittance
to German Jewish visa applicants. As described in Chapter II, the ability to satisfy
the LPC provision became the most difficult obstacle for the visa applicant to
overcome.

47

Frederick A. Lazin, "The Response of the American Jewish Committee to the
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(June, 1978): 296.
48
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49
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Chapter II
The Visa Application Process and the LPC Provision
Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and Geist manipulated the criteria governing
the issuance of visas to severely limit the entry of German Jewish refugees under
the authority of the 1917 and 1924 immigration statutes. In order to obtain a visa,
an applicant had to overcome two major barriers. The first burden was the
requirement that the visa applicant produce the required documentation, “if available,” in support of the application. The second burden was to satisfy the FSO
that they were not likely to become a public charge.
The burden of proving eligibility for admission rested upon the visa applicant. The State Department instructed FSOs to question the applicants in person,
scrutinize the documentation presented and consider relevant information from
other sources.

50

Although the State Department modified the interpretation of “if

50

The State Department’s official handbook on immigration described the critical role of FSOs in the visa application process: “Consular officers abroad receive the
applications for visas of aliens desiring to enter the United States and determine whether
or not visas may properly be issued in accordance with the immigration laws. They are
primarily responsible for determining the facts in each case, while the burden of proving
his admissibility rests upon the alien applicant. In determining the facts consular officers
examine applicants in person and their documents, as well as other evidence submitted by
them, and take into consideration information available from other sources.” U.S. Department of State, The Immigration Work of the Department of State and Its Consular Officers: Rev. To July 1, 1938 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1939), 23. During the 1930s, although the United States maintained 30 consulates throughout
Germany, only the embassies at Berlin, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Vienna (after the March
1938 Anschluss) were authorized to issue immigration visas. Zucker, "American Refugee
Policy in the 1930s,” 159. As of January 1, 1938, there were 24 FSOs in Berlin, Hamburg
and Stuttgart and seven FSOs in Vienna who were authorized to issue visas. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service List (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
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available” somewhat in 1933, this revision did not significantly facilitate the
application process. As the Nazis’ anti-Jewish campaign in Germany intensified
during the 1930s, the ability of visa applicants to obtain the necessary
documentation from local German authorities became increasingly difficult.
With respect to the second burden, to establish their eligibility for admission to the United States, German Jews, like all other alien applicants, had to provide detailed information about themselves and documentation demonstrating
substantial financial ability to support themselves for an indefinite period of time.
Alternatively, American relatives of the potential immigrants could submit “sponsor affidavits”; they also were required to present supporting documentation
verifying their financial ability and willingness to support visa applicants.
During the 1930s, the interpretation of the key word “likely” in the LPC
provision became a highly contentious issue between the State Department and
private American Jewish refugee organizations that worked on behalf of visa
applicants. As a result, Carr and Phillips twice revised the meaning of “likely”
during the 1930s. However, it was not until 1939 that these changes resulted in
the complete fulfillment of the annual German quota.
The procedure to obtain a visa began with the completion of a detailed
seven-page application, which was fraught with potential pitfalls. The application

1938), 2, 12-13. Available from Hathi Digital Trust Library,
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015077183427. Accessed on April 4, 2011.
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required thorough responses to 23 categories of questions. These included: (1)
places of residence during the past five years; (2) place and date of birth; (3) marital and family status; (4) names and addresses and nationality of close relatives
living in the United States and in Europe, Asia, or Northern Africa; (5) educational background; occupational experience; (6) political activities and affiliations; (7) the basis for the applicant’s belief that he “may be endangered in the
country of his present residence by reason of past political connections or activities”; and (8) “the names, addresses, and nationality of all persons or organizations interested in the admission of the applicant.” 51 Pursuant to Section 7(c) of
the 1924 Act, documentation was required, “if available” in support of the
application, which included two copies of the applicant’s “police dossier,” a birth
certificate, a certificate of good character, i.e., that the affiant had no criminal
record and proof that he was in good physical condition. 52

51

See Form B, “Biographical Data Concerning Alien Visa Applicant,” U.S.
Department of State, Visa Division. Available from Public Broadcasting Service,
American Experience,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/barvisa2.html.
52
Section 7(c) of the 1924 Act states: “The immigrant shall furnish, if available,
to the consular officer, with his application, two copies of his dossier and prison record
and military record, two certified copies of his birth certificate, and two copies of all
other available public records concerning him kept by the Government to which he owes
allegiance. One copy of the documents so furnished shall be permanently attached to each
copy of the application and become a part thereof. An immigrant having an unexpired
permit issued under the provisions of section 10 shall not be subject to this subdivision.
In the case of an application made before September 1, 1924, if it appears to the satisfaction of the consular officer that the immigrant has obtained a visa of his passport before
the enactment of this Act, and is unable to obtain the documents referred to in this subdivision without undue expense and delay, owing to absence from the country from
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Although Section 7(c) identified the types of documents required, the
meaning of the term “if available” caused major difficulties for visa applicants.
In other words, did the term “if available” refer to an inability to procure the required documents from the German authorities or did it refer to their physical
non-existence? American Jewish refugee organizations reacted quickly to this
ambiguity. For example, within six months of the Nazis coming to power, the
American Jewish Committee (“AJC”) requested an official interpretation of the
“if available” provision in order to facilitate the visa application process on behalf
of German Jews. 53 In response, Phillips stated: “[a] consular officer . . . has no
authority to waive the production of the documents . . . if they are obtainable.
Such documents will, however, not be required in the case of applicants who are
able to show that they are not ‘available’, that is, ‘procurable.’” 54
Phillips’ view that “if available” meant “obtainable” or “procurable” did
not clarify the question at all. In an effort to resolve the problem, the State Department issued an “Instruction to Consuls” in early 1934. This Instruction informed
FSOs that they were authorized to exempt the applicant from the documentation

which such documents should be obtained, the consular officer may relieve such immigrant from the requirements of this subdivision.” (Emphasis added)
53
See e.g., letter from Justice Joseph M. Proskauer to Hull, September 22, 1933,
American Jewish Committee Executive Office--Morris Waldman Files (Exo-29), Box 14
Folder 266,” American Jewish Committee (YIVO Institute Archives).
54
Letter from Acting Secretary Phillips to Justice Joseph M. Proskauer, August
5, 1933, Emergency Committee In Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars Records 19271949, MssCol 922, Box 162, Folder 13 entitled “American Jewish Committee 1933-35,
1938-39, 1942,” New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division.
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requirement when they could be obtained only with "serious inconvenience,"
"personal injury," "financial loss," or the "peculiar delay and embarrassment that
might attend the request of a political or religious refugee to his former government." 55
In early 1934, Geist acknowledged “certain difficulties” with a visa applicant’s ability to obtain documents from Nazi authorities and admitted it was not
“as simple a matter or routine.” Nevertheless, he still advised other FSOs against
adopting a more humane approach with respect to the presentation of documents
because of the alleged danger of fraud by “undesirable persons”.

56

This was a

coded reference to Jews. 57
In addition to the problems of obtaining required documents, German
Jews applying for visas to the United States faced several difficult obstacles
resulting from the interpretation and application of the LPC provision. The first
problem arose from varying interpretations of the meaning of the word “likely” to
become a public charge pursuant to Section 3 of the 1917 Act. Without official
instructions, there was a great deal of confusion and disparity among FSOs with
respect to the interpretation and application of the LPC provision.
In light of Hoover’s 1930 directive and its presumption that an immigrant
would not be able to find employment, FSOs interpreted “likely” to mean the
55

Kraut, “The State Department, the Labor Department, and German Jewish
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56
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57
See letter from Geist to Secretary Hull, September 10, 1934, page 27, infra.
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mere “possibility” of becoming LPC rather than the “probability” of doing so.
Until the Nazis’ Arisierung (“Aryanization”) of Jewish businesses and assets
began to cause serious economic hardship by 1934, some German Jewish visa
applicants were still able to demonstrate sufficient personal and independent
financial wherewithal to establish this interpretation of “likely.” 58 However, as
the effects of Aryanization became more oppressive, German Jews no longer had
sufficient personal financial resources. Thus, they were increasingly compelled to
rely upon sponsor affidavits from friends and relatives to satisfy the LPC provision.
Geist was concerned that the LPC provision was not an effective barrier to
halt “a flood of” undesirable Jewish immigrants because of the lack of uniformity
in the interpretation of the LPC provision. 59 He acknowledged the manipulation
of the LPC provision in order to deny visas to Jewish applicants. In 1934, Geist
wrote to Hull: “In order to prevent a flood of Jewish immigrants into the United

58

Aryanization refers to the forced transfer of Jewish-owned businesses and
property to “Aryan,” i.e., non-Jewish, ownership from 1933 to 1939. Roderick
Stackelberg, The Routledge Companion to Nazi Germany (New York, NY; London, UK:
Routledge, 2007), 256. James P. Moffitt (FSO-Stuttgart) reported that by the beginning of
1934, 1,180 German Jewish immigrants who retained “substantial personal resources”
had successfully emigrated and transferred “the sum of $1,020,460” to the United States.
Zucker, In Search of Refuge, 89.
59
Geist to Secretary of State, September 10, 1934, State Department officials
were concerned that the LPC provision would not halt immigration because “the interpretation . . . has not only varied somewhat as between one consular officer and another, but
it has varied strikingly from one year to another even at the hands of the same officials.”
Malcolm C. Burke (FSO-Hamburg) to Hull, February 23 1934. Kraut, "The State Department, the Labor Department, and German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940," 15-16.
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States, the likelihood of becoming a public charge was therefore taken as the chief
and easy grounds for refusal of visas to Jewish immigrants, especially when the
consul need not justify his decision.” 60
Not only did the interpretation of the LPC provision vary among American consulates in Germany, there were differences among FSOs within an individual embassy. As Malcolm Burke, FSO in Hamburg, observed “. . . [interprettation of the LPC] has varied strikingly from one year to another; even in the
hands of the same officials. In many instances, an examining officer is thrown
back largely upon intuition and instinct, and cannot avoid forming in his own
minds an opinion--favorable or unfavorable--which he is later unable fully to
justify by analysis and argument.”

61

The controversy surrounding the meaning of “likely” in the LPC provision
continued through the 1930s. For example, in 1937, Avra M. Warren (Chief, Visa
Division) observed that “[t]here was no ‘open sesame’, no rule of thumb which
could be followed, nor were there general observations applicable to every kind of
case which might arise.” 62 Therefore, the FSO determined the fate of a visa applicant because he exercised sole and final authority to grant a visa.
Satisfaction of the LPC provision was an enormously difficult obstacle for
a German Jewish visa applicant to overcome. If the visa applicant did not have
60

Geist to Secretary of State, February 2, 1934, Zucker, In Search of Refuge, 92.
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sufficient personal financial resources to satisfy the LPC provision, two affidavits
of support (or “sponsor affidavits”) from close American relatives and/or friends
were required pursuant to Section 9(b)(6) of the 1924 Act.

63

However, prior to

1933 and pursuant to their discretionary authority, FSOs chose not to rely upon
this section of the 1924 Act in order to grant a visa. Messersmith believed that a
sponsor affidavit from an American relative or friend was insufficient to demonstrate that an applicant would not become a public charge. He instructed his staff
that only applicants who were ''in possession of funds or property sufficient to
support themselves during the probably indefinite period of the present economic
crisis, i.e., funds or property yielding an income sufficient to provide their support" should be granted visas. 64 By 1934, this requirement of sufficient funds to
support the applicant for “the probably indefinite period of the present economic
crisis” was virtually impossible to satisfy for almost all German Jewish applicants
as the effects of the Third Reich’s “Aryanization” program intensified. 65
American refugee organizations complained that this standard was too
rigid. In response to such criticism, Carr wrote a memorandum that advised FSOs

63

Section 9(b)(6) of the Act states: “Any citizen of the United States claiming
that any immigrant is his relative, and that such immigrant is properly admissible to the
United States . . . may file with the Commissioner General a petition in such form as may
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64
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Secretary of State William Castle, July 31, 1931. Kraut, "The State Department, the
Labor Department, and German Jewish Immigration, 1930-1940,” 7, 8.
65
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to be “sensitive” in their communications with American citizens who were relatives of German Jewish visa applicants. 66
The FSOs’ examination of the sponsor affidavits was just as rigorous as
that used in the evaluation of the visa applicant’s application. For example, FSOs
required sponsors to provide a certified copy of their most recent federal income
tax return; a statement from their bank confirming the balances in their bank
accounts and an affidavit from another responsible person (such as the sponsor’s
employer) that verified the sponsor’s financial status. 67 The failure to furnish all
of the required information and documentation invalidated the application and
necessitated re-filing. FSOs frequently rejected applications for the smallest of
errors, whether inadvertent omissions or honest mistakes. 68
Although an affidavit was legally sufficient if it provided information concerning the financial status of the sponsor, many FSOs were reluctant to accept
affidavits from individuals who were friends or who were not members of the
applicant’s immediate family. FSOs asserted that individuals with close familial
66

Carr to American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, July 6, 1933. Kraut, "The
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http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/holocaust/filmmore/reference/primary/barvisa2.html.
68
Cecilia Razovsky, undated, “Case 1 Illustrates the Length of Time Needed to
Secure an Affidavit and the Net Work [Sic] of Contacts Necessary Throughout the
Country to Achieve Results,” Cecilia Razovsky Papers, P-290, Box 3, Folder entitled
“Refugee Relief Work (N.D., 1938-1939) Re: National Coordinating Committee--Aid
for German Refugees", American Jewish Historical Society (YIVO Institute Archives).

- 30 -

relationships would be more likely to provide financial support for visa applicants
than distant relatives or friends. 69
The issue of the affidavit’s content and the criteria that determined who
qualified as a “near enough relative” to supply the document raised major difficulties for visa applicants. In early 1934, George F. Warren, a noted economist and
advisor to Roosevelt, observed that many of the documents requested by FSOs
were “oppressive and illogical, and so varied that no two FSOs make the same
stipulation”. 70 Confident that their superiors in the State Department would
support their decisions, FSOs broadly interpreted the LPC provision and denied
visa applications when affidavits of financial support were not from immediate
family members. 71

69

Taylor, "Experts in Misery”, 16.
Warren stated that FSOs were requesting all types of documentary evidence,
e.g., proof of $5,000, or bank account equivalents, deeds to unencumbered real estate,
bank account statements, auditors' statements, and statements from employers that the
relative executing the affidavit was steadily employed and would continue to be employed. Minutes of Meeting of the Committee on German Jewish Immigration Policy,
January 26, 1934, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee Records, I-345, AR
1933-1944, File 683 entitled “Emigration into the United States, 1933-1944,” (YIVO
Institute Archives).
71
An incident occurred at the American consulate in Hamburg that illustrates the
affidavit problem. When a noted German Jewish professor asked the FSO for a definition
of the LPC provision, the latter stated only a person “who withdraws voluntarily from his
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obtain a visa. On the other hand, when asked about a young man who did not fit the
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Regardless of whether an applicant, friend and/or relative supplied an affidavit, it was the FSO’s responsibility to evaluate that document. FSOs believed
that the State Department expected them to restrict immigration, and accordingly,
it was more prudent to deny the visa.

72

Assistant Secretary Carr stated, with

unyielding bureaucratic determination, that despite the pressure to make concessions with regard to the public charge provision “consular officers are bound to
enforce it . . . faithfully and fairly."

73

Moreover, Hull admitted in the spring of

1934 that FSOs were instructed “to be particularly careful in requiring proof that
an alien applying for an immigration visa will not become a public charge.” 74
In July 1933, the Visa Division issued a new instruction to FSOs entitled
"Public Charge Provisions of the Law” in a further effort to curtail immigration.
That instruction informed FSOs that American citizens had moral and possibly
legal obligations to insure that their immediate relatives of visa applicants did not
become public charges. The new guidelines (1) emphasized that FSOs would
accept affidavits of support only from immediate family members of the visa
applicant and (2) instructed FSOs that the new criterion was whether the
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American relative was not only willing, but must also be able, to provide sufficient financial support. 75
With respect to distant relatives, Carr instructed FSOs that they would
have to judge not only the sponsor’s financial capacity, but also the credibility of
the relative’s interest and responsibility for the applicant. Applicants without a
relative's affidavit or without independent financial means would automatically
fail to satisfy the LPC provision and thus the applicant would not obtain a visa. 76
By the late summer of 1933, private American Jewish relief organizations
began to complain about the difficulties that the LPC provision had created for
visa applicants, i.e., the lack of uniformity by FSOs with respect to their interpretation of LPC provision and the severity of the documents requirement. 77 For
example, Jacob Billikopf (leader of various Jewish organizations including the
National Conference of Jewish Social Workers and the National Coordinating
Committee for Aid to Refugees and Emigrants) wrote to Judge Julian Mack
75
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(federal appellate judge, a leader of the American Jewish Congress and an expert
on immigration law) that “dozens and dozens of individuals whose credentials
. . . were in perfect form . . . were denied visas. . . . [t]he FSOs, particularly in the
provinces are pretty adamant . . . [and] in Berlin, too, they are so busy that they
adopt the ‘course of least resistance’.

78

The new Visa Instructions represented a small but important change in
immigration policy. Previously, FSOs had interpreted the LPC provision that
applicants must possess the financial resources to support themselves. Now documentary evidence of financial ability from close family relatives of the applicant
would be sufficient. The State Department hoped that this change in policy would
suppress “the most vocal critics of immigration policy” such as those from
American Jewish refugee organizations. 79 Despite this small liberalization of
policy, however, Messersmith and Geist continued to use their discretionary
authority to interpret broadly the LPC provision and denied visas to approximately 75% of all German Jewish applicants. By doing so, Jewish immigration
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into the United States dropped to its lowest level since the adoption of the 1917
Act. 80
In January 1937, in response to the public’s “perceived misinterpretation”
of its earlier (June 1933) Visa Instructions, the State Department again revised the
interpretation of “likely” in the LPC provision. 81 Carr instructed FSOs that
henceforth “likely" to become a public charge was to be interpreted as “probably"
instead of “possibly”:
According to the dictionaries [sic] ‘likely’ means ‘probably’. Some
of our officers with understandable zeal to enforce our immigration
laws with strictness have shown an inclination to interpret the word
‘likely’ as meaning ‘possibly’ instead of ‘probably’ which was the
intent of Congress. It would be virtually impossible for most aliens
to show affirmatively that if admitted to the United States they could
not possibly’ become public charges whereas a considerable number
might be expected to show that they would not ‘probably’ become
public charges. To give the law the narrower interpretation would
not carry out the intent of Congress . . . (Emphasis added) 82
Now, the State Department instructed FSOs to make a judgment whether the
applicant was probably going to become a public charge and if so, they should not
issue a visa. The possibility of becoming a public charge was no longer grounds to
deny the issuance of the visa.
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The State Department's revised 1937 Visa Instructions represented two
significant changes from its previous June 1933 guidelines. First, the State
Department interpreted "likely" in the LPC provision as a “probability" rather
than a "possibility" with respect to all classes of immigrants. Second, the revision
enabled the FSOs to accept both applicant and sponsor affidavits from distant
relatives pursuant to identical criteria. 83
In December 1937, John Farr Simmons (Chief, Visa Division, 1934-1937)
delivered an address at a forum conducted by the New York Committee on
Naturalization in New York City in which he depicted the use of the LPC provision as an economic necessity in order to protect Americans and their jobs.
Furthermore, he asserted that FSOs had applied the LPC provision “as uniformly
and conscientiously as possible” pursuant to the categories of persons barred from
admission as enumerated in Section 3 of the 1917 Act. He maintained that: “consular officers have [not] felt it their duty to cut immigration down to any given
level below the quota limitation . . . The exact percentage by which immigration
might be reduced was not their concern nor was it the concern of the State Department. The drastic reduction in immigration which occurred was merely an obvious and predictable result of administrative practice.” 84
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Simmons’ assertion was patently false. As Geist’s letter to Hull dated
September 10, 1934 and Hoover’s 1930 directive make clear, State Department
officials were very much concerned with the number of issued visas to applicants. 85 The small changes initiated in 1933 and 1937 did nothing to substantially
increase the number of visas issued to German Jews.
Despite the Third Reich’s increasingly vitriolic anti-Jewish campaign during this period, neither President Roosevelt nor Secretary of State of Hull instructed their subordinates to relax either the LPC provision or recommend that
the German quota be increased. For example, although President Roosevelt professed to New York State Governor Herbert Lehman in July 1936 that he
(Roosevelt) "feels great sympathetic concern . . . and will do everything in his
power to be helpful,” the President took no action concerning German Jewish
immigration. 86 As Henry Feingold observed: “[t]hat is perhaps what Roosevelt
desired, a policy which made political points at home but risked very little.” 87 His
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lack of action was consistent with his “policy of gestures” and without the President’s support, any attempted initiatives to help the refugees would fail. 88
Like Roosevelt, Hull did nothing to help the Jewish immigration issue
because he consistently focused on economic issues and other issues of international diplomacy. Hull was so preoccupied with other matters that Henry
Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, complained that the Secretary of State
was “obsessed by his trade agreements program and misled by the Anglophilism
and the hesitancies of career diplomats.” 89 In addition, Hull consistently issued
statements that “looked out for the government’s best interest” and thus left the
implementation of visa consular policy to his subordinates.
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dented wave of violence” against Austrian Jews. 91 As a result, the demand for
visas dramatically increased, which overwhelmed the American consulate in
Vienna.

92

In response to the Anschluss, the United States combined the German and
Austrian immigration quotas (25,957 and 1,413, respectively) for a total annual
quota of 27,370. However, this combined total would still allow only a small fraction of the hundreds of thousands who sought refuge in the United States. At a
press conference held approximately two weeks after the Anschluss, newspaper
reporters questioned President Roosevelt as to whether he favored legislation "to
relax our immigration laws.” He replied that there would be "no change in the
law." 93

91

Frank Caestecker and Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States (New York, NY: Berghahn Books, 2010), 236. Whereas German
Jews had experienced “Aryanization” and forced emigration over a period of years,
Austrian Jews suffered it “overnight,” which caused great panic among the populace. As
a result, “many hundreds” committed suicide in despair. Richard J. Evans, The Third
Reich in Power, 1933-1939 (New York, NY, 2005), 659.
92
A letter from John C. Wiley (Consul General-Antwerp, July 13, 1937-July 18,
1938; Consul General-Vienna, July 18, 1938-April 4, 1941) to Messersmith, dated March
19, 1938, described the seriousness of the situation: "We hear constantly of an everincreasing list of arrests, suicides and tragedies, house searches, plundering and confiscation. The tragedy here is greater than in Berlin. There it was gradual; here it came from
one day to the next. . . . [A consulate or consulate general] should, for the present at least,
be well staffed in order to cope with visa, passport and welfare cases en masse." Less
than a week later, he informed Hull: “The visa section [of the consulate] is in a state of
siege. This will continue for a protracted period.” Letter from Wiley to Messersmith,
March 22, 1938. Both cited in Taylor, “Experts in Misery,” 89-90.
93
Presidential Press Conference, March 25, 1938, Complete Presidential Press
Conferences of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1972) Vol. 11,
249-50.

- 39 -

The second event of 1938, Kristallnacht, represented a turning point in the
Nazi persecution of the Jews because the Third Reich dramatically escalated its
efforts to forcibly “rid” itself of its Jewish population. 94 In a violent rampage that
night, bands of the Nazi SA (German acronym for Sturmabteilungen [stormtroopers], a paramilitary organization) destroyed millions of dollars’ worth of
Jewish businesses, schools, homes and synagogues. 95
During a press conference three days later, President Roosevelt expressed
his shock and indignation at this horrific event: “The news of the past few days
from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States. . . I myself
could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth-century civilization.” 96 On November 18, 1938, Roosevelt announced that, in response to Kristallnacht, he would offer asylum to "twelve to fifteen thousand refugees from,
principally, Germany and Austria" who were in the United States on visitors'
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permits".

97

He stated that "[t]he situation apparently has arisen that because of a

recent decree those visitors' passports will be canceled as of the thirteenth of
December . . . therefore I have suggested to Miss [Frances] Perkins [Secretary of
Labor] that they be given six months extensions." 98 Later, Perkins confirmed that
her agency “continued to permit refugees who entered the country on visitors’
visas to apply for further extensions and . . . permission has been granted where a
showing was made that the visitor would be subject to persecution if compelled to
return to Germany.” 99 Despite repeated calls by American Jewish groups for
greater government assistance for German Jews, the Roosevelt administration did
little to respond to the refugees’ dire situation other than to combine the annual
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German and Austrian quotas and to grant permanent residency status to those
German Jews who had previously obtained visitor’s visas. 100
The escalation of Nazi persecution of the Jews after the Anschluss and
Kristallnacht precipitated an unprecedented demand for visas by German Jews for
immigration to the United States. It is undisputed fact that between Hitler’s rise to
power in January 1933 and Kristallnacht in November 1938, German Jewish
emigration to the United States represented 40.48% of the authorized quota. In
contrast, after the Anschluss and Kristallnacht, FSOs received approximately
60,000-70,000 visa applications in 1938, which overwhelmed the American consulates and would have filled the German quota for the next two to three years. 101
Nevertheless, FSOs granted visas to only 17,870 German Jews (65.3% of the
quota) in 1938. By June 1939, the demand for visas was so high that the State
Department filled the entire quota of 27,370 for the first and only time. 102
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The immigration path to the United States for German Jews was exceedingly difficult during the 1930s. The evidence establishes that despite its protestations to the contrary, the State Department, using the LPC provision, pursued a
policy of severely restricting the number of visas issued to German Jews seeking
to escape Nazi genocide. As Geist confided to Hull, “to prevent the flood of
Jewish immigrants to the United States, the likelihood of becoming a public
charge was therefore taken as the chief and easy grounds for refusal of visas to
Jewish immigrants, especially when the consul need not justify his decision.”
Applications for visas were rejected for trivial reasons or for no reason at all.
Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and Geist crafted and executed this policy. Chapter III
presents the evidence establishing that all of them shared in common an antipathy
toward Jews.
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Chapter III
Anti-Semitism in the State Department
Efforts to increase German Jewish immigration during 1933-1939 largely
failed because of the actions of Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and Geist. There is
abundant direct evidence that Carr and Phillips were anti-Semitic and strong
circumstantial evidence that Messersmith and Geist also held anti-Jewish beliefs.
This chapter examines that evidence.
The record of Carr’s hostility toward Jews began shortly after the end of
World War I. His diary contains numerous expressions of anti-Semitism. For
example, Carr “tolerated” better-dressed Jews and hated “common” Jews, i.e.,
poorer, because of their appearance and lack of social graces. For this reason,
during a trip to Atlantic City in February 1924, he wrote in his diary that he did
not care for the boardwalk there because he observed that:
Jews [are] everywhere and of the commonest kind. Yet most of them
were well dressed . . . The Claridge is filled with them and few presented a good appearance. Only two others besides myself in dinner
jacket. Very careless atmosphere in the dining room.
Carr continued in his diary that his dislike of “common” Jews caused him to
change hotels where he again observed "mostly Jewish guests, but of the higher
type than at the Claridge." 103
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Another entry in his diary concerned a boat trip to Albany in 1924, in
which he wrote: "Most of the passengers were Jews of one kind or another" and
wrote that it was "appalling to observe the lack of appreciation of the privilege
they are having." Less than a week later, he additionally noted that he found
Detroit laden with "dust, smoke, dirt, [and] Jews". 104
Carr’s antipathy towards Jews affected his professional conduct as a
public official in the State Department. He zealously represented the State Department before Congressional committees on fiscal and budgetary matters and later
was instrumental in assuring the passage of the 1924 Act, which established the
quota system. 105 In 1920, Congressman Albert Johnson, chair of the House Committee on Immigration and an ardent opponent of immigration, held hearings to
consider revisions to the immigration laws. 106 Johnson “enjoyed [the] consistent
cooperation” of State Department officials, including Carr, who was then head of
Consular Services and who supported a restrictive immigration law.
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wrote a lengthy memorandum in support of reducing immigration that reflected
his virulent anti-Semitism. 108 In that document, Carr described the emigrants
sailing from Rotterdam as “Russian or Polish Jews of the usual ghetto type. Most
of them are more or less directly and frankly getting out of Poland to avoid war
conditions. They are filthy, Un-American and often dangerous in their habits.” 109
Johnson later incorporated Carr’s statement in the published House
committee report on the hearings. 110 American Jewish leaders reacted with
indignation and outrage at the inclusion of Carr’s statement in the report. For
example, Louis Marshall, a well-known corporate and constitutional lawyer and
Jewish community leader, denounced Carr’s “opprobrious” description of Jews:
. . . there has never been in our history a precedent such as that created
by this report. It seems to single out for opprobrious reference the Jews
who desire to migrate to the United States. There is scarcely a paragraph
which does not contain a slighting reference to them. They are depicted
as undesirable, as coming in great hordes, as being of low physical
and mental standards, and as desirous of coming here, not to become
useful and industrious members of the community in which they wish
to live, but in Search of ‘an easier life.’ 111
In response, the State Department strenuously denied Carr’s implication
that Jews were unclean or inferior and stated that he had identified and criticized a
subject or citizen should be barred from the United States. Moreover, "[t]he powers of the
chief of Visa Office are almost unlimited, and appeal against his decision is practically
impossible." Id., 870.
108
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group of immigrants that happened to be Jewish. Moreover, the State Department
emphasized that it always gave completely unbiased accounts of conditions. 112
However, Marshall remained unconvinced. He characterized Carr as "a pronounced anti-Semite," who, he alleged, made appointments with FSOs based on
whether one's name sounded Jewish. 113 The latter charge was never verified.
Nevertheless, despite allegations from prominent leaders of the American Jewish
community that anti-Semitism was a prime motive and purpose of the proposed
legislation, Congress enacted the 1924 Act. 114
During the 1930s, Carr was fully aware that widespread anti-Semitism
existed in Germany and that the Nazis were unrelenting in their punitive persecution of the Jews. Yet, like Roosevelt and Hull, Carr (1) viewed the Nazis’ antiJewish campaign as “an internal matter of the German Government” and (2)
claimed that if the United States were to approach Germany to request better
treatment of the Jews on humanitarian grounds, “it would probably have the
opposite effect and incite further activity against them.” 115
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Phillips’ diary reveals that he, too, held strong anti-Semitic beliefs. For
example, on a 1936 trip to Atlantic City, he complained in his diary that the resort
was "infested with Jews" and “the beach had disappeared under a swarm of
‘slightly clothed Jews and Jewesses.’” 116 Phillips also mocked his Jewish business associates in his diary: "Bernard Morrison, my little Jewish friend from
Boston, who has a habit of butting into my affairs, called me to suggest that the
estate should sell to some Jewish friend of his in New York the Phillips building." 117
As Under Secretary of State, Phillips refused to relax existing immigration
law requirements, which could have resulted in an increase in the number of visas
issued to German Jewish immigrants. Moreover, until mid-1936, Phillips was not
only Carr’s superior “but also his closest ally in the battle for restriction” at the
State Department. 118 For example, in 1933 Philips wrote to Judge Joseph
Proskauer that: “[a] consular officer has no authority to waive the production of
the documents required if they are obtainable.” 119 In 1935, Phillips, in response
to an earlier meeting with representatives of the American Jewish Committee, the
116
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American Jewish Congress and B’nai B’rith, he stated that he would consider
their appeal for the government to aid German Jewish refugees. Although he later
informed William Dodd (Ambassador to Germany, 1933-1937) of the meeting,
Phillips stated, “The foregoing is communicated to you solely for your information.” There was no recommendation from Phillips to take any action whatsoever. 120
Phillips was keenly aware of allegations from American Jewish groups
who charged that anti-Semitism was responsible for the State Department’s
narrow interpretation of immigration law. In an effort to soften such criticism,
Phillips suggested to Roosevelt that the President appoint Judge Julian W. Mack
to act as an intermediary between Jewish organizations and the State Department. 121 Simultaneously, Phillips confided in his diary that he and Carr would
work with the Labor Department in order to devise "some new scheme which
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while not opening the doors to an influx of Jews, will satisfy them that we are
doing everything possible within the law." 122
Phillips not only completely ignored credible press accounts of increasing
acts of anti-Semitic violence against German Jews, but he misrepresented the
seriousness of the situation to the White House. 123 In addition, he consistently
argued that the United States was not responsible for their safety. For example, in
mid-1933, Harold Debrest, a prominent rabbi and feature editor of the Jewish
Forum, telegraphed Roosevelt and implored the President “to reassure American
Jews that their ‘brethren in Germany’ would not be ‘massacred.’” 124 The White
House forwarded Debrest’s communication to Phillips. The Under Secretary
replied to Roosevelt: “I am happy to inform you that no reports from our
representatives in Germany afford any ground for crediting the accuracy of the
press dispatches in question . . . [and] . . . that our representatives will continue to
be alert to and active in behalf of the rights of American nationals.” 125
Even reports that rampaging bands of Nazi SA attacking Jews and screaming “the best Jew is a dead Jew” two years later did not motivate Phillips to take
any official action. 126 For example, in 1935, Phillips met with eight representa-
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tives of four major Jewish organizations, who gave the Under Secretary a
memorandum detailing the evidence of the increased violence against German
Jews, the effects of “Aryanization” and the continuing deprivation of their civil
rights. Despite the overwhelming evidence of the Nazi’s increasing violence
against German Jews, Phillips refused to commit himself to any course of action.
Phillips’ contemporaries also perceived his anti-Semitism. For example, in
1933, James G. McDonald, head of the League of Nations High Commission for
Refugees from Germany (“High Commission”) and later delegate to the Evian
Conference in 1938, told a group of prominent American Jewish leaders that
Phillips held anti-Jewish attitudes. 127 In 1934, Louis D. Brandeis, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, correctly recognized the Under Secretary’s antiSemitic attitude and accurately predicted that "Phillips’ wrong action on
Germany's Jews will not end until [Phillips] leaves the State Department.” 128
As a result, when American Jewish leaders requested a relaxation of the
LPC provision, Phillips urged his colleagues at the State Department that the
pleas of the refugees' representatives should not affect the implementation of
American immigration law. In 1935, the AJC, B’nai B’rith, and the Jewish Labor
Committee wrote to Phillips in support of the High Commission’s attempt to
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gather international support to aid the plight of German Jewish refugees.

129
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From the perspective of American Jewish leaders and others who watched
the increasing anti-Jewish atmosphere within Germany with great concern during
the 1930s, the actions of senior State Department such as Carr and Phillips were
“at the least indifferent and at worst callous." 132 American Jewish refugee
organizations presented evidence anti-Semitism against the State Department as
early as the summer of 1933 when the AJC alleged that FSOs had deliberately
manipulated American immigration law in order to limit the issuance of visas to
German Jewish immigrants:
[A]nother recent arrival from Germany . . . . furnished me with a
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ing that proffers of aid from relatives and friends here are summarily disregarded by consular officers. We have shown the letters to
others, who advise us that their own German relatives rendered
reports to them of a similar character. 133
Predictably, Richard W. Flournoy Jr., the legal adviser to the State Department,
responded in August 1933 that the agency had acted within the letter of the law
and that the charge of anti-Semitism was baseless. 134
Messersmith’s record of anti-Semitism also had a long history. On July 7,
1920, while FSO in Antwerp (1920-1922), he revealed his anti-Jewish prejudice
in a letter to the State Department when he wrote of his observations regarding the
arrival of Polish Jews in Antwerp. He wrote: “There is no doubt that many of
these people leave Poland without a passport and the American visa . . . they
receive letters from relatives or friends in America . . . with an order for a steamer
ticket enclosed, and they are told in the letter ‘to go to Antwerp.’ Then American
relatives and friends give them advice as that in the way they proceeded to the
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United States years ago. These people are in rather a pitiable condition.” 135 In a
letter to George E. Anderson (FSO-Rotterdam) later that year, Messersmith made
the unsubstantiated allegation that many Polish Jews who escaped to Germany in
order to avoid military service arrived in Antwerp to seek American visas. 136
Strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Messersmith’s antipathy
towards Jews was responsible for his attitude toward the issuance of visas to
German Jews during the 1930s. Although the Third Reich had been openly persecuting Jews from the moment Hitler came to power, Messersmith insisted that
adherence to the letter of the law took precedence over the Nazi’s persecution of
the Jews. As a result, the number of visas issued to German Jewish applicants was
limited to only 40.48% of the total available annual quota between 1933 and
1939. 137
In the late summer of 1933, American Jewish leaders complained about
Messersmith’s anti-Semitism. For example, a letter from Max Kohler, an attorney
who was an expert on immigration issues and a leader in the American Jewish
community, to Hull described an incident in which Messersmith made an antiSemitic remark:
. . . [I]nformation of a disturbing character has reached us . . . a gentleman recently arrived from Germany [who]. . . was recently sent by one
135
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of our immigrant aid societies to me for professional service. He informed
me that when he attempted to acquaint one of our consular officials in
Germany with particulars as to atrocities Jews there were subjected to,
he was interrupted by the official with the statement: ‘You Jews are only
afraid for your own skins! We consular officials are here to maintain
the good relations between the two countries.’ (Emphasis added) 138
In the fall of 1933, Messersmith professed to Jacob Billikopf, a wellknown leader of various Jewish organizations, that he would “favor the Jew much
more than the Gentile, because [he] realize[s] under what conditions the former is
forced to live.” 139 Nevertheless, Messersmith never allowed any humanitarian
factors to motivate him “to bend the rules” in favor of German Jews. 140 Even
after the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, Messersmith, who then was Assistant
Secretary of State, stressed the importance of “staying the course” in a letter to
John Wiley. Messersmith reminded Wiley of the vital importance of the continued
implementation of restrictive immigration policy and wrote, "[p]ersons seeking
immigration visas are seeking a privilege and not a right." 141
Similarly, on March 2, 1938, Messersmith held a meeting with several
Jewish lawmakers (including congressman Emanuel Celler, a long-time critic of
the State Department’s visa policy) who implored Messersmith to relax the
Department’s visa restrictions. Unmoved by their pleas, Messersmith articulated
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his professed concern about a possible anti-Semitic backlash in the United States
with unfortunate consequences for American Jews if the State Department relaxed
its visa policy. The legislators capitulated and concurred with Messersmith’s
assessment and by the end of the meeting, the FSO had persuaded the group that
“the times were in-appropriate for revision.” Subsequently, Messersmith informed Hull that he took a great deal of satisfaction in knowing that his “mission
had been accomplished.” 142 After the Anschluss occurred ten days later, which
resulted in an enormous increase in the number of visa applications by German
Jews, Messersmith repeated his concern that a large influx of refugees would not
be welcome in the United States. 143
Others were aware of Messersmith’s anti-Jewish bias. Immediately after
the Anschluss, for example, Herbert Feis, the senior specialist in international
trade and economics at the State Department (1931-1943), wrote to Felix
Frankfurter that Messersmith was a “real obstacle” to any relaxation in the
immigration laws. 144 Feis’ observation is particularly perceptive because
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Messersmith knew, based upon correspondence from Geist, that the Jewish refugee situation had become critical in the aftermath of Kristallnacht. For example,
on December 5, 1938 Geist wrote: “Now the situation is somewhat hopeless. The
Germans are in a mood of triumph and victory over their success in
Czechoslovakia; and they consider that their course forward is positively irresistible. They have embarked on a program of annihilation of the Jews and we shall
be allowed to save the remnants. If we choose; but I am afraid that the chances of
getting any cooperation from the persons who are now firmly in power are slight
indeed.” 145 Nevertheless, Messersmith maintained that “irrespective of what our
feelings may be and what the situation may be, we must carry through the law as
it stands for that is doing the best service all around” and never encouraged or
supported any significant change in the American immigration policy.
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resentful that we are not giving them on a golden platter a position which nativeborn Americans would be glad to get at the end of a long and hard fought career.
In that same letter, he also wrote that he was "glad to say that this country belongs
to the native-born American" and was hopeful that "the ideals of our native-born
Americans may continue to control." 147
Like his mentor Messersmith, Geist served as FSO in Berlin. Both closely
monitored the German Jewish situation because they were responsible for implementing visa policy during the 1930s. 148 Geist revealed his antipathy towards
Jews beginning in early January 1934 as a result of the publication of “German
Refugees and American Bureaucrats” in Today magazine. The article sharply
criticized the visa decisions made by FSOs and asserted that anti-Semitism
existed in the State Department. 149 In response to the article’s allegations, Geist
explained to Hull that the primary obstacles to an increase in German Jewish
emigration to the United States were German laws that prohibited the transfer of
property and capital and the “inadequate means of poorer Jews.”

147
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Geist emphasized that if the LPC provision were relaxed, undesirable
persons would undoubtedly receive visas.

150

Consistent with his views expressed

earlier, Geist wrote to Hull that the best method to bar their admission to the
United States was through the strict application of the LPC provision. 151 As in
other examples of Geist’s anti-Semitism, this was an indirect reference to Jews. 152
Subsequently, Geist professed sympathy for the plight of the Jews after
Kristallnacht. 153 Nevertheless, he failed to exercise his discretionary authority and
continued to restrictively interpret the LPC provision, which barred the majority
of German Jewish visa applicants to the United States. In response to
Messersmith’s concerns in April 1939 that the American Friends Service Committee (a Quaker relief organization ) was offering assistance in order to increase
German Jewish immigration, Geist replied that he agreed with his former
mentor’s assessment of the situation. He also agreed that FSOs should continue to
limit the issuance of visas to German Jewish applicants.

154

It is difficult to recon-

cile Geist’s professed change of heart after Kristallnacht with his actions, especially since he remained just as stubborn as Messersmith with respect to the issuance of more visas to German Jewish applicants.
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Chapter IV
There was No Merit to the Arguments Advanced by State Department
Officials in Support of the Restrictive Issuance of Visas to German Jews
Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and Geist justified their decisions to restrict
the granting of visas to German Jews based upon three claims. First, allowing
large number of German Jewish immigrants to the United States would result in
the replacement of American workers with these refugees. Second, they urged
that Jewish immigrants were “all radicals, anarchists or at least malcontents.” 155
Third, they maintained that the German Jewish refugee crisis was exclusively a
Jewish problem. 156 These arguments lacked merit. They were merely pretexts to
disguise the anti-Semitism of these State Department officials that was the primary factor in the restrictive issuance of visas to German Jews. 157
1.

A “Huge” Influx of German Jewish
Immigrants Deprived Americans of Employment
As a result of the Great Depression, approximately 15,000,000 Americans

became unemployed and economic hardship was widespread by the end of
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1932. 158 In light of the very limited availability of employment, rumors spread
that the United States had admitted a “huge” wave of Jewish immigrants and deprived thousands of Americans of jobs, especially at Jewish-owned department
stores in New York, such as Macy’s, Bloomingdales and A & R Strauss. The alleged replacement of American workers with Jewish immigrants for scarce jobs
purported to add significantly to the unemployment problem and greatly increased
anti-alienism and anti-Semitism in the United States.

159

In an effort to enhance the State Department’s role in successfully barring
the admission of immigrants, including German Jews, to the United States and
thus ameliorating the unemployment problem, Carr proudly wrote in 1933:
“Since 1930 it is estimated that some 500,000 aliens have been unable to establish
to the satisfaction of FSOs and of this Department that they would not be likely to
become public charges if granted visas and admitted to this country and they have
therefore remained abroad instead of coming here to join the ranks of the
12,000,000 unemployed already here. It may be said that there is still a registered
demand in our consulates of some 276,000 aliens who are seeking visas to come
to this country, notwithstanding existing economic conditions.” 160
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Carr’s statement greatly exaggerated the truth and as a result, American
relief organizations and academic institutions expended significant time and effort
during the 1930s to counteract such hyperbole. 161 For example, a 1939 study commissioned by the American Friends Service Committee entitled Refugee Facts: A
Study of the German Refugee in America effectively discredited this misconception. The study concluded that (1) between July 1932 and December 1938, the
number of German Jewish refugees who entered the United States totaled 65,404
and (2) approximately 22,362 refugees returned to German-occupied lands during
the same period. Therefore, the net increase of German Jewish refugees who came
to America totaled 43,042, or an average of only 6,622 annually. 162
Similarly, an article entitled Those German Refugees—Facts Do Not Justify the Propaganda About Refugees Displacing American Job Holders stated
that: “In the current fiscal year, which ends June 30, 1939, we may expect an
161
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immigration from Germany (including Austria) equal to the total allowable by our
quota regulations—27,370.” 163 It concluded that less than 75,000 German Jewish
immigrants were admitted into the United States between July 1, 1932 and June
38, 1938.
In addition to the false rumors concerning the number of German Jewish
immigrants admitted into the United States, reports circulated that immigrants
were replacing Americans at their places of employment. These rumors were
similarly unfounded. In an effort to rebut these claims, in late November, 1938,
Macy’s, a major New York City department store, issued a public declaration that
emphatically denied such rumors: “For some two months past we have heard
from time to time an utterly false and malicious rumor to the effect that store
people in New York have been let go to hire refugees from Europe. Now the
papers have heard the rumor, and have asked us what we know about it. So far as
this store is concerned not one word of truth supports such a statement.”
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The admission of approximately 75,000 German Jewish refugees to the
United States between 1932 and 1939 hardly constituted a “huge” influx of immigrants given the fact that the average annual unemployment rate in the United

163

Dr. Henry Smith Leiper, "Those German Refugees—Facts Do Not Justify the
Propaganda About Refugees Displacing American Job Holders," Current History (May,
1939): 1.
164
“Stores Here Deny Refugee Rumors,” The New York Times, November 26,
1938.

- 63 -

States between 1923 and 1939 was 16.09%.

165

Furthermore, many of the

refugees could not work, e.g., elderly people and children. 166 Thus, the admission
of 75,000 German Jewish refugees could not and did not deprive significant
numbers of Americans of employment opportunities. 167
2.

German Jewish Immigrants Were “Infected with”
Bolshevism and Held Radical Political Beliefs
After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution overthrew Czarist Russia, Americans

feared the spread of a “sinister influence”, i.e., Communism, which they believed
sought the overthrow of democracy and capitalism in the United States. Moreover, many Americans believed that Eastern European Jews were "infected with
Bolshevism . . . [and that they were] unpatriotic, alien, [and] unassimilable." 168
Both of these erroneous claims intensified anti-Semitism in the United States
165
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during the 1920s and contributed to the implementation of restrictive immigration
law in the interwar period. 169 Furthermore, allegations that “the Jews in America
were more loyal to their tribe than to their country” were common in America
during the 1930s. In light of their desire to remove the "Red" from the "true blue,"
Americans focused on the Jew, who represented “that symbol of ancient, hidden
enemies” and slammed the door completely in order to “eliminate the guesswork.” 170
Claims that the majority of German Jewish immigrants held radical political beliefs were not true. First, in the years immediately preceding World War I,
many Americans mistakenly equated radicalism with Eastern European Jews
based upon the publication of the alleged The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,
which was “one of the most infamous documents of anti-Semitism”. 171 Although
proven a complete fabrication in 1921, the influence of the Protocols endured and
provided the “antiradical rationale for anti-Semitism throughout the 1920s.” 172
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For example, Messersmith disapproved of the alleged radicalism of
German Jewish professors, which he cited as grounds for the denial of their visa
applications. He claimed that they would compete with American academicians
who, he said, had greater knowledge of human relations and “experienced more
real contact with the life of our people.” He thought that the ideas of these academics were "totally out of accord with our own social and economic ideas" and
were "in direct opposition to U.S. social order." Moreover, Messersmith asserted
that universities should invite Jewish refugee professors only "after thoughtful
consideration" because of the allegedly dangerous influence of the majority of
them. At times, he compared the Americanization of "the average Jew . . . who
. . . will be very glad . . . to make a home for himself in our country and to fit himself into our picture" with the problems raised by the admission of these scholars
"who feel that they have a mission in life" and who "may potentially be a danger
to us . . . which we cannot ignore." 173 There is no evidence to support
Messersmith’s claims about German Jewish professors; his statements served as a
pretext for his anti-Semitism.
A May 1934 report entitled Jews and Communism published a New York
City consulting firm, represented an early effort to discredit the misconception
that all German Jewish immigrants held radical political beliefs. Jews and Com-
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munism disproved the claim that Jews in the Soviet Union, Germany and the
United States played significant roles in promoting Bolshevism in those countries.
The report estimated that the number of Jews in the American Communist party
represented only "one-tenth of one percent of the total Jewish population," with
the highest concentration of Jewish communists in New York City. Jews and
Communism concluded with the assurance that communist tactics tended “to
alienate rather than attract Jews” because American Jews tended to enter the legal,
medical or educational professions or membership in labor unions that were firmly anticommunist and committed to the American way of life. Moreover, the
report stated that Jews generally rejected the Communist Party’s anti-religion and
anti-Zionist convictions.
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voted in elections held during the Weimar Republic (1919-1933) were affiliated
with the liberal democratic parties. Finally, the Statement strongly criticized “the
cloak of a so-called link between Jews and communism, which has no existence
in fact, but which is being used to confuse the minds not only of Germans, but of
people all over the world.” 175
Three years later, in May 1938, the AJC released its Confidential Report
on [an] Investigation of Anti-Semitism in the United States, which was based
upon the results of a survey conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation that
conducted field work for the Gallup polls. 176 In response to the question, "do you
think they [Jews] tend to be more radical in politics than other people?" 43% said
yes and 24% stated they had no opinion. Furthermore, when asked whether Jews
were more conservative or more radical than others were, 31% responded “more
radical,” 21% responded “more conservative” and 48% said about the same. The
survey cleared revealed that American’s popular perception was that Jews were
politically different from other Americans but not necessarily more radical. 177
Results of such surveys disproved misconceptions held by State Department officials that all German Jewish professors held “radical” beliefs.
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Second, during the 1930s there was a general trend towards rapid "Americanization" among German Jewish immigrants. The vast majority of them were
“workmen, businessmen and manufacturers” who were motivated by the desire
(1) to attain “economic success and recovered status” and (2) to be a contributing
member of American society. 178 Beginning in the late 1880s, Jewish immigrants
established landsmanshaftn (local aid associations) in various localities, e.g., New
York City, in order to achieve these goals. The landsmanshaftn promoted “immigrant acculturation” and significantly contributed to the immigrant's Americanization. 179 As Rabbi Stephen Wise declared: "We are Americans, first, last, and all
the time. Nothing else that we are, whether by faith or race or fate, qualifies our
Americanism." 180 Thus, in contrast to the mistaken belief of many Americans,
the majority of German Jewish immigrants did not hold radical beliefs and were
not a threat to the American way of life.
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3.

The Jewish Refugee Crisis is Exclusively a Jewish Problem
During the 1930s, there was a widespread perception in the United States

that the Jewish refugee crisis was exclusively a Jewish problem. 181 Consistent
with the “politically conservative attitudes” of the Roosevelt administration with
respect to Germany, State Department officials and many Americans believed that
it was fruitless to try to help Jewish refugees because “nothing that will be done
will in any way avoid further action against the Jews." 182
Although President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull could have instructed
State Department officials to relax the interpretation of the LPC provision and/or
the implementation of visa policy, they delegated that responsibility to their subordinates. Their actions were consistent with the official position of the Roosevelt
administration that the Nazi persecution of the Jews was an internal matter and
only informal efforts should be used to “moderate” the situation. As Hull wrote in
early 1933: “The German authorities are treating the Jews shamefully and the
Jews in this country are greatly excited. But this is also not a governmental affair.
We can do nothing except for American citizens who happen to be made victims.
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We must protect them and whatever we can do to moderate the general persecution by unofficial and personal influence ought to be done." 183
Messersmith wrote that it was useless to think, ". . . that the outside world
will allow itself to be blackmailed into some scheme to help Germany through the
use of the Jews as pawns." 184 The refugee situation in Greater Germany had
exasperated him because he contended that any relaxation in America’s restrictive
immigration policy would result in a much bigger European Jewish problem.
Messersmith was convinced that: “. . . there is no action, international or private,
which can adequately take care of the refugee movement. No matter if all the
governments in the world were to join together and give large financial grants and
no matter if we opened up three or four new Palestines . . . it would not be a
solution of the refugee problem.” 185
The claim that the refugee crisis was exclusively a “Jewish problem” and
that there was no solution to it was erroneous, i.e., by the late 1930s, the plight of
the German Jewish immigrants had become a world problem. 186 In April 1933,

183

Hull to the Charge d'Affaires in Germany (George Gordon), March 24, 1933,
FRUS, 1933, Vol. II, 330. Available from University of Wisconsin Digital Collections,
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.1933v02. Accessed on April 1, 2011.
184
Shafir, "George S. Messersmith: An Anti-Nazi Diplomat's View of the
German-Jewish Crisis,” 41.
185
Messersmith to Geist, December 20, 1938, page 4, Messersmith Papers.
186
Although the majority of the persons whom the Third Reich declared to be
“non-Aryan” were Jews, other ethnic groups, such as the Roma (formerly known as
Gypsies), were also victims of Nazi persecution and extermination. See, e.g., Sybil
Milton, "’Gypsies’ as Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany,” in Social Outsiders in Nazi
Germany, edited by Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

- 71 -

the Third Reich began to implement its anti-Jewish legislation based upon its
malevolent anti-Semitic ideology. 187 As a result, an “unprecedented migration”
of Jewish refugees occurred in Europe who desperately sought to escape their
misfortune and establish a new life in other countries, including the United States.
Since such a large displacement of people created international instability
and global tensions, it was apparent that the cooperation of the international
community would be required to find a solution to the dire plight of the German
Jews. By 1935, the Jewish refugee crisis had indeed become a concern of “international politics.” As a result, the League of Nations created the High Commission for Refugees from Germany, which represented that former’s belief that the
problem must be “shared” by the global community because no one country could
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be expected to carry the burden.

188

As John Hope Simpson, a liberal British poli-

tician, observed, “. . . the German Government is placing the other governments
of the world in a dilemma. Either they have got to open their doors to hundreds of
thousands of poverty-stricken Jews, non-Aryans and political refugees, or they
have got to close their doors and to share the responsibility . . . That is not a fair
dilemma in which to place the world. As a result of this National Socialist policy
there has been an exodus of about a hundred and fifty thousand refugees. Of these
the great majority are Jews. . . . This problem is one which demands international
action . . .” 189

188

The League of Nations established the High Commission on October 11, 1933
to resolve the growing Jewish refugee problem and appointed James G. McDonald as the
Commission’s head. McDonald later became the first American Ambassador to Israel.
However, after two years of virtually no significant accomplishment and a great deal of
frustration, McDonald resigned. Claudena M. Skran, "Profiles of the First Two High
Commissioners," Journal of Refugee Studies 1, no. 3-4: 289, 294; Spear, "The United
States and the Persecution of the Jews in Germany, 1933-1939," 224; Michael R. Marrus,
The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War
(Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2002), 161. In his letter of resignation,
McDonald recommended that the international community apply “moral pressure” on the
Third Reich to halt its persecution of the Jews. Moreover, he emphasized the critical need
to tackle the underlying problem, i.e., foreign countries would not relax their immigration
laws in order to accept German Jewish immigrants because he believed that “considerations of diplomatic correctness” took precedence over a humanitarian response. The New
York Times, December 30, 1935.
189
John Hope Simpson, "The Refugee Problem," International Affairs (Royal
Institute of International Affairs 1931-1939) 17, no. 5 (Sep-Oct., 1938): 616, 618.
Similarly, Dorothy Thompson wrote in 1938: “This chaotic migration has added
prodigiously to world unrest . . . we must record the growth of anti-Semitism in countries
which never before were conscious of having a ‘Jewish problem,’ and where, prior to the
past five years, the Jews were satisfactorily assimilated to the whole society. The growth
must be regarded with alarm, not only for humanitarian reasons but because it contains in
itself a germ destructive of the essential principles of democratic society, of any society
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Another attempt by the international community to solve the German
Jewish refugee crisis occurred in July 6-15, 1938, when delegates from 32 nations
met at Evian les-Bains, France.

190

The representatives recognized that the refugee

problem was extremely complex and decided to “to set up machinery to alleviate
the distress of the German and Austrian refugees” and where possible, establish
connections with other refugee organizations. 191 Although the American and
European press initially proclaimed the Evian Conference “the great humanitarian
event of the year,” it proved to be ineffective. 192 Unfortunately, the sole result of
the gathering was the decision to establish a permanent intergovernmental com-

based on principles other than those of primitive racialism.” Dorothy Thompson,
"Refugees: A World Problem," Foreign Affairs 16, no. 3 (1938): 377.
190
The countries represented at the Evian Conference included Great Britain,
Germany, the United States, France, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Argentina, and
Brazil. Roosevelt appointed James G. McDonald as the Acting Chairman of his Advisory
Committee on Political Refugees.
191
Eric Estorick, "The Evian Conference and the Intergovernmental Committee,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 203 (1939): 137.
192
S. Adler-Rudel, "Before 1933 and After: The Evian Conference on the Refugee Question," Leo Baeck Institute Year Book 12, no. 1 (Jan., 1968): 239. The primary
cause of the Conference’s ineffectiveness was that the delegates refused to follow the
example of the United States, which at least combined its German and Austrian quotas in
March 1938 in a small effort to increase immigration of German Jews. These representatives cited the tense economic and social situations in their respective countries and refused to relax their restrictive immigration provisions. There was also concern among the
representatives that the acceptance of German Jewish immigrants would set a precedent,
i.e., other countries might begin to expel unpopular groups from their own populations.
Michael Schäbitz, "The Flight and Expulsion of German Jews," in Jews in Nazi Berlin
from Kristallnacht to Liberation, edited by Beate Meyer, Hermann Simon and Chana C.
Schütz (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 50-51.
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mittee to investigate possible resettlement locations for refugees and to negotiate
an agreement with Germany with respect to the systematic emigration of Jews. 193
Nevertheless, nations did come together on two occasions in an attempt to
resolve the crisis. The mere existence of the High Commission and the Evian
Conference demonstrates that international cooperation during the late 1930s
could have “made a difference” in the plight of these refugees, i.e., any or all of
the participating countries at the Conference could have relaxed their immigration
laws and admitted more German Jewish refugees. The fact that no country would
relax its quota restrictions “provided the Nazi's regime anti-Semitic campaign a
propaganda bonanza" and four months later, Kristallnacht occurred. 194
After Kristallnacht, the Nazi’s persecution of the Jews became increasingly brutal
and destructive. By that time, the Third Reich had denied Jews their right to earn
a living, stripped them of basic civil rights, deprived them of their assets and
stigmatized them as “parasites” who must be removed from German society.
Messersmith and Geist, with the support of Carr and Phillips restricted the issuance of visas to German Jews based upon pretexts to conceal their anti-Jewish
bias. As a result, they successfully prevented the immigration of the vast majority
of German Jews to the United States.
193

Proceedings of the Intergovernmental Committee, Evian, July 6-15, 1938 ...
Resolutions and Reports (London, 1938), in Yitzhak Arad, Israel Gutman, and Abraham
Margaliot, eds., Documents on the Holocaust: Selected Sources on the Destruction of the
Jews of Germany and Austria, Poland, and the Soviet Union (Lincoln, NE; Jerusalem:
University of Nebraska Press; Yad Vashem, 1999), 97-98.
194
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Conclusion
During the period 1933 to 1939, Carr, Phillips, Messersmith and Geist
established and implemented the State Department’s policy of severely restricting
the issuance of visas to German Jews. Of the approximately 300,000 visa applications submitted by German Jews, only 75,000 were granted. All of these officials
shared a common bond of anti-Semitism, which the evidence establishes was the
primary factor influencing their conduct as government officials. The arguments
they advanced to justify their decisions were unconvincing, lacked merit and were
pretexts to conceal their antipathy towards Jews.
On the eve of World War II, Chaim Weizmann sadly observed that the
world had become divided into two camps, one of countries expelling the Jews,
and the other of countries, which did not admit them. 195 The refusal to grant more
visas to German Jews had disastrous results. By December 31, 1939, 213,390
Jews remained in Germany and 60,000 remained in Austria. 196 Of the approximately 6,000,000 people slaughtered by the Nazis, it is estimated that approxi-
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196
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mately 60% (130,000) of German Jews and 83% (50,000) Austrian Jews perished
in the Holocaust.

197

197

Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews. Vol. III (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 1321.
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